In April 2025, the arrival of the USS Mount Whitney, the flagship of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, in Tripoli was far from routine. Against a backdrop of intensifying great power competition, particularly between the United States and Russia, this high-profile visit underscored Washington’s desire to remain a strategic actor in Libya and the broader Mediterranean. With a delegation that included Vice Admiral J.T. Anderson and senior American diplomats, the visit served as a clear signal: the United States is reasserting its presence in a country that has increasingly become a geopolitical chessboard.
Libya, fragmented and unstable for over a decade, has once again found itself at the centre of foreign manoeuvring. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria earlier this year, Russia has repositioned a portion of its Mediterranean naval assets to Libya, turning eastern ports like Tobruk into new centres of activity. Over the past twelve months, Russian warships—including the missile cruiser Varyag, the amphibious landing ship Ivan Gren, and the frigate Admiral Shaposhnikov—have made multiple dockings at Libyan facilities. Ostensibly described as “technical calls” or “cooperation visits,” these stops are part of a broader military and logistical build-up that echoes Russia’s earlier moves in Syria.
Military analysts tracking satellite imagery have observed the unloading of mobile radar systems, containerised electronic warfare gear, and surface-to-air components from Russian vessels docked in Tobruk. Local sources have corroborated that Russian engineers are expanding existing port infrastructure, upgrading docking capacity and integrating fortified depots inland. The evidence points not to temporary deployments, but to a long-term military foothold in a country still reeling from two competing governments and multiple armed factions.
The United States views these developments with increasing concern. Libya’s strategic location at the southern edge of the Mediterranean gives it outsize importance in maritime control, energy transport, and migration flows. A permanent Russian presence in Libya would challenge NATO’s southern flank and provide Moscow with a platform for influence in both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the volatile Sahel region.
To counter this, the U.S. has responded with a dual approach—military projection and attempts at political engagement. The docking of the Mount Whitney in Tripoli is part of this renewed posture. It comes on the heels of a joint exercise earlier this year involving American B-52 bombers conducting coordination manoeuvres with western Libyan tactical air controllers. That operation, conducted over the central Libyan desert, demonstrated the Pentagon’s capacity to operate in the region and also served as a subtle invitation for Libyan defence leaders to consider deeper integration with U.S. systems and training protocols.
Yet, this projection of military might is taking place in parallel with a hard truth: American influence, particularly its soft power, is diminishing. Decades ago, Washington would have backed such moves with an arsenal of civilian tools—development aid, long-term educational programmes, and extensive public diplomacy. Today, much of that infrastructure has been scaled back. Budget constraints, domestic political shifts, and a growing isolationist undercurrent have weakened the State Department’s global presence, including its ability to sustain long-term engagement in Libya. This has forced the Pentagon to take on roles traditionally filled by civilian agencies—an unsustainable model for complex, post-conflict environments like Libya.
Nonetheless, there are still openings where the U.S. can act decisively. One such area is Libya’s maritime domain, which remains porous and largely unregulated. Human smuggling remains rampant. From Zuwara and Sabratha in the west to the more isolated stretches of coastline near Benghazi, smugglers exploit Libya’s weak coastal surveillance to ferry thousands of migrants toward Europe. Already in 2025, Italy and Malta have seen a spike in irregular crossings, with over 30,000 people arriving by sea since January. Many of these journeys begin with human traffickers operating with impunity from Libyan shores.
This maritime crisis presents the U.S. with an opportunity to position itself as a stabilising force. American naval forces could assist with intelligence-sharing, aerial surveillance, and the provision of maritime radars and patrol boats. Technical support could help the Libyan coast guard professionalise its operations and develop early-warning systems to intercept smuggling vessels. Importantly, such cooperation would not only serve U.S. security interests—it would also be welcomed by European allies who are struggling to handle the renewed influx of migrants.
Meanwhile, deeper political engagement with Libya’s fragmented security apparatus remains both critical and challenging. Since the country’s split into rival administrations in Tripoli and Benghazi, unifying its military forces under civilian command has been an elusive goal. Russia, which has thrown its support behind General Khalifa Haftar in the east, has no interest in seeing a cohesive Libyan national army that could reduce its leverage. The U.S., by contrast, has the technical expertise and experience to support a gradual reintegration process—if it can commit to the long-term task.
This would require the United States to facilitate dialogue between rival security chiefs, encourage the development of neutral training academies, and offer incentives for interoperability—such as shared equipment standards, logistics chains, and communication protocols. Hosting Libyan officers for professional military education in the United States could also help foster future partnerships. These are not dramatic interventions, but they are the types of engagements that can slowly build institutional coherence in a fractured state.
Libya is not just a country of strategic interest—it is a crucible where the broader competition between East and West is playing out in real-time. Moscow is betting on the durability of authoritarian patrons and paramilitary integration, extending its influence through shadowy contractors, arms shipments, and selective development projects. Washington, if it wishes to offer a different path, must do so with both clarity and humility. It must speak less in slogans and more in deliverables. For many Libyans, promises of foreign support are a familiar tune, often played with no follow-through. What matters now is consistency, reliability, and tangible results.
Moreover, Washington must take care not to treat Libya merely as a theatre for competition with Russia. While the strategic framing may help focus attention in Washington, it risks alienating Libyans who are deeply wary of being used as pawns in a foreign game. Any U.S. engagement must place Libya’s own sovereignty and stability at its core. This means respecting local political processes, even when slow or frustrating, and resisting the temptation to back strongmen simply because they offer “order.”
One of the most promising areas of future cooperation lies in Libya’s economic rehabilitation, particularly its maritime economy. American companies and technical experts could assist in rehabilitating Libya’s degraded port infrastructure, modernising its customs operations, and developing regulatory frameworks to fight smuggling and illicit finance. These steps, while not as headline-grabbing as military exercises, would contribute directly to Libyan resilience and make the country less susceptible to external coercion.
Ultimately, Libya is at a crossroads. The forces that pulled it apart are still strong, but so too are the opportunities to bring it back together—if supported by responsible international actors. The United States still has tools at its disposal, though they are fewer than before. What it does have is a reputation, a residual store of goodwill among many Libyans, and the ability to offer something that Russia cannot: a genuine partnership grounded in the rule of law, transparency, and long-term development.
The question now is whether Washington is prepared to make that offer—not with words, but with actions. The USS Mount Whitney cutting through Libyan waters may be a symbol of presence, but symbols alone will not build a future. Libya needs engagement that is sustained, practical, and above all, credible. In the era of great power competition, credibility is the rarest—and most valuable—commodity of all.
