As trade hostilities between the United States and China deepen in 2025 under President Donald Trump’s renewed tariffs, China has turned to one of its most potent yet underappreciated weapons: rare earth elements. These obscure minerals, while rarely discussed outside industrial or scientific circles, are essential to the modern economy. From smartphones and electric vehicles to missile systems and MRI machines, rare earths are foundational to the technologies that power the 21st century. Unlike tariffs or duties, this is a front where China holds a commanding advantage—and where the U.S. faces steep obstacles to retaliate in kind.

What Are Rare Earths?

Rare earth elements comprise a group of seventeen metals that, despite their misleading name, are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust. However, their extraction and refining are incredibly difficult, environmentally hazardous, and financially intensive. While the United States does have some deposits, it has long been dependent on China for the refined materials. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2023 China accounted for 61 percent of global mined rare earth output and a staggering 92 percent of the global processing capacity. This means that even if raw materials are mined elsewhere, they are typically shipped to China for refinement—a choke point Beijing controls with surgical precision.

These materials are essential in the production of permanent magnets that power the motors of electric vehicles and wind turbines, the data storage systems in hard drives, and even the compact engines used in consumer electronics. They are also critical to the defense industry, where they are embedded in guidance systems, jet propulsion, sonar arrays, and advanced medical technologies like MRI scanners.

April 2025: Beijing Pulls the Rare Earth Lever

Earlier this month, in direct response to President Trump’s imposition of a 34 percent tariff on a wide range of Chinese goods, the Chinese government enacted export restrictions on seven types of rare earths, specifically those used in high-performance magnets. These rules require all exporters to secure government licenses for these minerals and for any product containing even trace amounts of them. According to industry sources, including John Ormerod, founder of the rare earth consultancy JOC, shipments destined for American and European firms have already been halted while exporters scramble to understand and comply with the new licensing requirements.

The restrictions focus primarily on heavy rare earth elements, which are rarer than their lighter counterparts, more valuable on a per-kilogram basis, and significantly more difficult to separate and refine. These elements are indispensable for manufacturing the ultra-compact, high-strength magnets used in advanced electronics, military-grade equipment, and green energy applications. Joshua Ballard, CEO of USA Rare Earth, noted that China controls 98 percent of global heavy rare earth production. As a result, U.S. companies reliant on these materials for defense and tech production must now seek permission from the very government they are strategically opposing.

How Did China Corner the Market?

China’s dominance of this sector was not built overnight. Although rare earth mining in China began as early as the 1950s, it wasn’t until the late 1970s and 80s that the industry gained momentum. Leveraging low labor costs, loose environmental regulations, and imported refining technology—much of it originally developed in the United States, Japan, and Europe—China built a vertically integrated supply chain. It mastered not only the extraction of rare earths but the ability to refine, manipulate, and mass-produce the components essential to high-tech manufacturing. This long-term investment strategy was underscored in 1992 by former leader Deng Xiaoping, who famously declared, “While there is oil in the Middle East, China has rare earths”. Today, that prophecy is fulfilled.

The United States, once a pioneer in rare earth development, gradually ceded the market. As China ramped up its output, American firms found themselves unable to compete on cost. According to Ormerod, not only did these companies lose their competitive edge—they lost institutional knowledge and skilled labor. Once American manufacturing began to shutter its rare earth facilities, there was no easy path back. Meanwhile, China scaled up, modernized its refineries, and benefited from economies of scale and generous government subsidies. Between 2020 and 2023, 70 percent of all U.S. imports of rare earth compounds and metals came directly from China, according to a recent U.S. Geological Survey report.

Strategic Disruption, Surgical Strike

This isn’t China’s first use of rare earths as leverage. In 2010, it suspended shipments to Japan over a maritime dispute. More recently, it banned rare earth refining technology exports in 2023, a move designed to slow down competitors’ ability to catch up. Today, the strategy has evolved into something more precise. Rather than blanket bans, the Chinese government is deploying highly targeted restrictions—focusing on magnets, alloys, and high-purity derivatives that are fundamental to advanced technologies.

This approach hits particularly hard in sectors that depend on ultra-specialized components: aerospace, automotive, semiconductor manufacturing, and precision defense technologies. As economist Justin Wolfers told reporters, China is demonstrating its capacity to “exert incredible economic might by being strategic and surgical”.

Trump’s Executive Reaction: The Critical Minerals Probe

In response to these developments, President Trump signed an executive order to launch a national security investigation into America’s reliance on imported critical minerals. His statement cited growing concerns over the vulnerability of U.S. supply chains, warning that this dependency could jeopardize national defense readiness, price stability, and broader economic resilience. While Trump’s administration continues to wield tariffs as a primary instrument of pressure, this executive action acknowledges the deeper industrial threat posed by China’s rare earth grip.

Is the U.S. Ready to Compete?

The Biden administration, and now Trump’s second term, have poured hundreds of millions into domestic rare earth initiatives. Since 2020, the Department of Defense has invested over $439 million in rare earth development projects with the goal of achieving a self-sustaining mine-to-magnet supply chain by 2027. Some American firms are beginning to gain ground. Phoenix Tailings, a Massachusetts-based startup, has developed a clean technology process for refining rare earths without waste or emissions. The company currently produces 40 metric tons of rare earth alloys annually and plans to expand tenfold with a new facility in New Hampshire. Similarly, USA Rare Earth is constructing a plant in Texas that will eventually manufacture 5,000 tons of rare earth magnets each year. The company also owns a heavy rare earth deposit in West Texas containing all the elements targeted by China’s latest restrictions.

Still, challenges remain formidable. While the U.S. has raw materials and promising startups, it lacks the commercial-scale infrastructure and industrial workforce needed to process rare earths at competitive prices. The technological processes, environmental clearances, and capital requirements involved are immense. Even with federal support, industry leaders acknowledge that catching up to China could take years—if not a decade.

A New Cold War?

The rare earth battle is not merely an economic skirmish. It is part of a broader geopolitical contest over technological supremacy, resource security, and strategic autonomy. Control over rare earths increasingly means control over the future of clean energy, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and next-generation defense systems. By asserting dominance through these latest export controls, China is not just retaliating against U.S. tariffs—it is signaling its industrial confidence and geopolitical maturity.

The United States now faces a stark choice: either rebuild the supply chains it dismantled decades ago or continue operating at the mercy of a rival superpower that has mastered the art of converting obscure minerals into strategic leverage.

In March 2025, a massive cybersecurity breach at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) sent shockwaves through federal agencies. At the center of the controversy is the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a Musk-backed task force originally created to streamline bureaucratic inefficiencies. Daniel Berulis, a senior IT specialist at the NLRB, has come forward with explosive allegations that DOGE operatives—granted administrative access to the NLRB’s systems—quietly exfiltrated more than 10GB of sensitive data.

This data included classified whistleblower reports, confidential union dispute records, private employer filings, and internal agency communications. According to Berulis, system logs were altered to hide digital footprints, and one login attempt traced to a Russian IP address used valid credentials, indicating that insider knowledge may have been compromised or shared.

Though geofencing protocols successfully blocked the foreign IP, the incident underscores the high-stakes vulnerabilities posed by politically empowered units operating outside normal federal cybersecurity procedures.

What Is DOGE and Why It’s Under Fire

The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) was launched during Donald Trump’s second term as a “lean government” task force aimed at cutting red tape and reimagining how federal agencies operate. But what began as a modernization initiative has rapidly evolved into an agency with sweeping authority and unprecedented access.

DOGE operatives have embedded themselves in key federal institutions—including the Department of Labor, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission—where they’ve conducted audits, reviewed internal systems, and reportedly accessed sensitive case files. While DOGE frames this as agile governance, critics argue it’s something else: a legally ambiguous operation with minimal oversight and unclear lines of accountability.

Internal reports show that DOGE personnel at the NLRB were granted full backend access for what was described as an “IT audit.” However, several cybersecurity officers within the agency raised alarms about the lack of vetting, proper credentials, and opaque protocols. These concerns were reportedly overruled by senior political appointees.

Observers now worry that DOGE is not just a task force—but a stealth government apparatus operating without the legal or technical safeguards that usually apply to federal IT actors.

Political Tensions and Legal Ramifications

The breach has ignited a firestorm across Washington, intensifying the political debate surrounding DOGE’s true purpose. The Communications Workers of America (CWA), one of the largest labor unions in the U.S., has filed a federal lawsuit accusing DOGE of unlawful surveillance and data theft. The union alleges that the breach has not only compromised sensitive case files but also eroded trust in the institutions meant to protect labor rights.

“This isn’t just a breach of protocol—it’s a violation of trust between workers and the institutions meant to protect them,” said the union’s lead counsel during a press conference.

In a parallel development, former FTC officials have warned that DOGE’s broad access to non-public market data—including merger filings and antitrust casework—could be misused for political or financial leverage. Senator Ron Wyden has called for emergency Senate hearings, describing DOGE as “a shadow surveillance agency masquerading as a reform task force.”

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has launched an official investigation into DOGE’s data governance practices, access privileges, and contractor affiliations.

Cybersecurity Risks of DOGE’s Unchecked Access

The NLRB breach is more than a technical failure—it reveals systemic risks tied to insider access and the lack of enforceable cybersecurity standards within politically driven task forces.

DOGE’s systems deployed at the NLRB were never certified under FedRAMP, the federal government’s standardized security framework for cloud services. This means they bypassed critical safeguards such as penetration testing, data encryption benchmarks, and ongoing threat assessments.

Even more concerning, portions of DOGE’s digital infrastructure were reportedly managed by contractors linked to Elon Musk’s private companies, including SpaceX and X.AI. This raises not only ethical concerns about potential conflicts of interest but also logistical questions about where federal data may be flowing and whether private firms are inadvertently gaining access to restricted government datasets.

During DOGE’s NLRB deployment, server logs were overwritten and restructured—a tactic cybersecurity experts recognize as a hallmark of internal sabotage. Without logs, investigators struggle to determine what data was viewed, copied, or extracted.

The Insider Threat: A Hidden Weakness

Insider threats are among the most dangerous cybersecurity risks. Unlike external hackers, insiders have legitimate credentials, which allows them to operate under the radar of many security tools. This can be a disgruntled employee, a careless contractor, or in this case, operatives empowered by political mandate but lacking cybersecurity vetting.

When such actors have access to classified or legally protected files, they can extract and traffic that information without triggering alarms. Data harvested in such breaches can be sold on the dark web—often through anonymous networks like Tor or via cryptocurrencies like Monero. Common targets include Social Security numbers, legal case strategies, whistleblower identities, and internal memos—all of which can fetch significant value on illicit marketplaces or be used for blackmail, corporate espionage, or disinformation campaigns.

A 2023 report by CISA found that 40% of major data breaches in federal agencies involved an insider component, often enabled by lax access controls or weak inter-agency coordination.

The DOGE breach fits this mold: full access was granted without audit logs, third-party contractors were present, and the data that vanished was high-value and legally sensitive.

The Bigger Picture: When Efficiency Overrides Privacy

DOGE’s defenders insist the program is an antidote to bloated federal bureaucracy, arguing that the rapid deployment of tech solutions is essential for government innovation. But critics say that efficiency without accountability is a security threat in itself.

Multiple whistleblowers across other federal agencies have described similar patterns: DOGE personnel overriding permissions, accessing legally protected documents without a warrant, and editing digital logs to cover their tracks. In one case at OSHA, DOGE reportedly reviewed whistleblower complaint files and altered metadata without authorization—actions that, if verified, would constitute criminal violations under federal data protection laws.

The fundamental question becomes: how much operational freedom should politically appointed tech teams be allowed? And what checks exist when those teams begin operating across multiple agencies with vague reporting structures?

For many, the DOGE situation signals the rise of a new kind of government threat—not from adversarial nation-states, but from within.

What’s Next?

With lawsuits pending, investigations underway, and political pressure mounting, DOGE’s future is uncertain. Several lawmakers from both parties have endorsed a temporary suspension of all DOGE activities pending the outcome of a comprehensive cybersecurity audit.

Meanwhile, federal watchdogs are pushing for the following immediate actions:

• Revocation of DOGE’s admin privileges across all federal systems
• Re-certification of all DOGE-deployed tools under FedRAMP and NIST standards
• Mandatory disclosure of all third-party contractors affiliated with DOGE
• Real-time logging and audit enforcement for all cross-agency access

Until those steps are taken, cybersecurity experts warn that federal networks remain at risk. For the federal workforce, this breach is not merely a technological incident—it is a warning. When accountability is sidelined in favor of political expediency, the consequences extend far beyond a single agency.

The public must now contend with a deeply unsettling reality: some of the most dangerous cybersecurity vulnerabilities may be operating from behind the firewall, not outside it.

President Donald Trump’s recent executive order to establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve has sparked debate among cryptocurrency experts and financial analysts. The initiative aims to create a government-held stockpile of Bitcoin and other digital assets, primarily sourced from cryptocurrencies forfeited in criminal or civil proceedings.

Formation of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve

President Donald Trump’s executive order on March 6, 2025, established the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve (SBR) to position the United States as a leader in digital asset strategy. The SBR is capitalized with Bitcoin seized by federal agencies through criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings. This initiative aims to treat Bitcoin as a reserve asset, maintaining it as a store of value without selling the deposited assets.

In addition to the SBR, the executive order mandates the creation of the U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile, which includes digital assets other than Bitcoin obtained through similar forfeiture processes. The Secretary of the Treasury is tasked with determining strategies for the responsible stewardship of these assets.

To ensure comprehensive oversight, the executive order requires all federal agencies to provide a full accounting of their digital asset holdings. This measure seeks to centralize ownership, control, and management of these assets within the federal government.

Diverse Reactions from the Crypto Community

The announcement has elicited mixed reactions within the cryptocurrency sector. Charles Edwards of the Capriole Fund referred to the initiative as “a pig in lipstick,” highlighting that without active purchasing, the reserve merely formalizes existing government-held Bitcoin. He emphasized, “No active buying means this is just a fancy title for Bitcoin holdings that already existed with the government”.

Jason Yanowitz, co-founder of Blockworks, expressed concerns about the lack of a clear framework, suggesting that arbitrary asset selection could distort markets and erode public trust. He stated, “Without a clear framework, we risk arbitrary asset selections, which would distort the markets and drive a loss of public trust”.

Government’s Stance and Future Plans

The executive order mandates that the Treasury and Commerce secretaries develop strategies to acquire additional Bitcoin for the reserve, ensuring these methods are budget-neutral and impose no additional costs on taxpayers. Sacks assured that the reserve’s establishment “will not cost taxpayers a dime,” clarifying that the government does not intend to sell any Bitcoin deposited in the reserve but will retain it as an asset.

Market Implications and Legal Considerations

Following the announcement, Bitcoin’s price experienced a decline of over 5%, influenced by the perception that the U.S. government would not actively purchase Bitcoin. The legal framework surrounding the reserve remains uncertain, with questions about potential legislative requirements or possible legal challenges. Further details are anticipated during the upcoming crypto summit at the White House.

A Final Note

The Strategic Bitcoin Reserve is facing sharp criticism for lacking substance. Being dismissed as “a pig in lipstick”, it’s argued that without active buying, it’s merely a rebranding of Bitcoin the government already holds.

The 5% drop in Bitcoin’s price post-announcement suggests investors see little impact from the move. Without a clear acquisition strategy, the reserve risks being more of a political statement than a meaningful financial policy.